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Abstract
The complexity of the problems to be addressed in an e-democracy frame-
work and the variety of involved stakeholders, with diﬀerent backgrounds,
views and access to information sources, lead to consider the case in which e-
negotiation should be performed among subjects who have partial, sometimes
incompatible, information and can hardly be gathered to discuss issues alto-
gether, under the supervision of a facilitator. We propose a statistical method
which addresses the issue of partial and incompatible information, merging it
and then using it to get a ﬁnal decision, possibly in an automatic way, through
the processes of e-negotiation and e-arbitration.
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1 Introduction
Development of e-democracy practice is leading more and more towards situations
in which larger communities are involved in decision processes, with stakeholders
having diﬀerent views and knowledge on the problems at hand. When problems
are faced within a representative system by an elected body (parliament, city coun-
cil, etc.), all the stakeholders have, more or less, access to the same information
sources. In a statistical language, it means that diﬀerent stakeholders are able to
specify models on all the observable quantities (considered as random variables)
and utilities. They can go even further, specifying prior beliefs on the parameters
of model, via their prior distributions, according to the Bayesian paradigm. Negoti-
ation and arbitration are therefore about how to combine diﬀerent distributions and
utilities deﬁned on the same set of random quantities. Aggregation occurs either
through consensus (negotiation) or through an external authoritative intervention
(arbitration).
E-democracy should allow more people to be involved in the decision process,
as in the project e21 about Local Agenda 21, recently approved by the Italian
Ministry of Infrastructures and Innovation, which involves the Italian authors of the
paper. In such project, citizens will be involved, directly or through representative
groups, in informed discussions about environmental issues through mailing lists,
forums, etc., with the possibility of accessing information via Internet. It is quite
natural that nobody in such wide group will have access to all the information and
that the stakeholders will not be able to specify models, priors and utilities on all
the quantities. Therefore, the stakeholders will provide diﬀerent distributions and
utilities on diﬀerent sets of random quantities. Suppose the case of a new military
installation: the Army will have access to classiﬁed information, not available to
the ordinary citizens, whereas scientists might have information on side eﬀects (e.g.
nuclear radiations) which might be neglected by the Army. In this scenario, the
information can be not only partial, but also incompatible.
The process of negotiation to reach consensus is therefore quite diﬃcult and the
methods proposed in literature cannot be applied here, because, to our knowledge,
they do not allow for handling incompatible distributions. Since the number of
1involved stakeholders is, in general, large, then any sound method should be made
as automatic as possible and available for an easy use by a facilitator running the
negotiation process. The heuristic method we present for combining probability
distributions does not aim to solve the unsolvable problem of incompatible evi-
dence; rather, it tries to identify its non controversial components in a way fulﬁlling
the above requirements. To identify non controversial evidence and combine it, we
extend an information–theoretic approach introduced in a simple case by Krac´ ık
(2004). Although our method could be applied to complex statistical models where
both densities of observable quantities (models) and unknown parameters (priors)
could be given via some partial, incompatible marginals distributions, here we will
concentrate on some realistic scenarios in e-democracy, where stakeholders are able
to specify probability density functions exactly, without any dependence upon pa-
rameters.
In Section 2 we will present the proposed approach, whereas its application in e-
negotiation and e-arbitration is discussed in Section 3. In Section 4 some examples
are illustrated and few concluding remarks are presented in Section 5.
2 The proposed method
In Krac´ ık (2004) it is suggested to combine probability density functions (pdf, for
short) deﬁned on diﬀerent or partially overlapping spaces, so that the resulting
pdf is close to each (partial) given pdf in some sense speciﬁed via the Kullback–
Leibler divergence. Instead of introducing cumbersome notations for the general
formulation of the method, we will show it by a simple example.
Let X1, X2 be two random quantities and suppose that three experts provide
the pdf’s f1(x1), f2(x2) and f3(x1,x2), respectively. Krac´ ık (2004) deﬁnes a “com-
promise” among them as the pdf ˜ f which minimizes
α1KL(f1(x1), ˜ f(x1)) + α2KL(f2(x2), ˜ f(x2)) + α3KL(f3(x1,x2), ˜ f(x1,x2)) (1)
where αi are nonnegative,
P
i αi = 1, and KL(p,q) is the Kullback–Leibler diver-
gence of p on q, deﬁned as
R
p log(p/q), (see for instance, Dacunha–Castelle and
Duﬂo, 1986). Of course, we assume that all the necessary conditions for the ﬁnite-
ness of KL are satisﬁed. It can be shown that f is a solution of (1) if and only if it
satisﬁes
f(x1,x2) = α1f1(x1)f(x2|x1) + α2f2(x2)f(x1|x2) + α3f3(x1,x2). (2)
Assuming that each fi expresses the opinion of diﬀerent stakeholders, we can in-
terpret (2) by saying that each stakeholder completes his/her partial opinion by
the corresponding part of the optimal “compromise” ˜ f. This interpretation is the
starting point for the generalization introduced here.
Suppose N random quantities X1,...XN are at stake and K stakeholders are
providing marginal pdf’s on a (proper) subset of them. In particular, the k-th
stakeholder will provide the pdf fk(X(Ik)), where X(Ik) := (Xi1,...,XiIk) is a
subset of X(N) := (X1,...,XN). This formulation allows for the extreme case of
all marginal pdf’s being undeﬁned for some variable Xi: we will not consider this
case. It is worth mentioning that the marginal pdf’s could be compatible and lead
to a unique joint pdf, although we will be more interested in the cases in which
either no compatible pdf exists or a class of compatible pdf’s is obtained.
We assume that the k-th stakeholder has no opinions on the remaining N − Ik
random quantities so that any value taken by them will not aﬀect his judgements
about the variables in X(Ik). Formally, we translate this independence property
into
fk(X(k)|X) ≡ fk(X(k)|X ∩ X(Ik)), (3)
2for any X(k) ⊆ X(Ik) and any X ⊆ X(N), with k = 1,...K. Therefore the density
is not changing if we add or remove a conditioning variable which is not in X(Ik).
We will use the property (3) in the next Step 2 as a building block for our
combined pdf. In particular, we will be looking for the contribution of the k-
th stakeholder to the conditional pdf f(Xn|Xn−1,...,X1). If Xn 6∈ X(Ik), then
no contribution is provided by the k-th stakeholder; otherwise, we introduce the
notations X
(Ik)
n := X(Ik) ∩ {Xn+1,...,XN} and Y
(Ik)
n := X(Ik) ∩ {X1,...,Xn} to
denote the random variables considered by the k-th stakeholder among, respectively,
the last N − n and the ﬁrst n elements of the ordering X1,...,XN. Repeated
applications of (3) will transform the middle term of the right hand side of
fk(X(Ik)) = fk(X(Ik)
n |Y (Ik)
n )fk(Xn|Y
(Ik)
n−1)fk(Y
(Ik)
n−1)
into fk(Xn|Xn−1,...,X1), by adding the variables from {Xn−1,...,X1} not con-
sidered by the k-th stakeholder. f(·|Y
(Ik)
0 ) has the meaning of f(·). In words, we
have split the joint pdf into three parts using the chain’s rule. The ﬁrst involves a
subset of {XN,...,Xn+1}, the second (the key one) is about Xn and the third is
about the variables {Xn−1,...,X1} which are not considered by the stakeholder.
Property (3) allows us to complement the second part to get a pdf on Xn given all
Xn−1,...,X1.
The basic method we propose to combine partial, incompatible information is
described by the following
Algorithm 1.
1. Choose an ordering for the variables (e.g. XN,...,X1) and apply the chain’s
rule, i.e.
f(X1,...,XN) = f(XN|XN−1,...,X1) · f(XN−1|XN−2 ...X1) · ... · f(X1).
2. For each component f(Xn|Xn−1,...,X1), n = 2,...,N, look for all the con-
tributions of the stakeholders on it, i.e. either none or fk(Xn|Xn−1,...,X1).
f(X1) is treated similarly.
3. Combine (linearly, with weights to be discussed later) all the contributions
fk(Xn|Xn−1,...,X1) into e f(Xn|Xn−1,...,X1), for n = 2,...,N. e f(X1) is
treated similarly.
4. Get the joint density e f(X1,...,XN) via chain’s rule, combining for n =
2,...,N all e f(Xn|Xn−1,...,X1) and e f(X1), i.e.
e f(X1,...,XN) = e f(XN|XN−1,...,X1) · e f(XN−1|XN−2 ...X1) · ... · e f(X1).
Since e f depends on the selected order of the variables, a variant of the method
considers the mixing over all e f’s obtained for the N! possible permutations of the
random quantities. We will not go into further details since it will add unnecessary
complexity in the presentation and we deem that, in practical problems, stakehold-
ers (or a facilitator in their behalf) could agree at least on the order.
3 E-negotiation and e-arbitration
The method presented in Section 2 (and illustrated later in Section 4 by some
examples) can be applied in negotiations and arbitrations and, even better, in e-
negotiations and e-arbitrations. In fact, the former processes can be handled in
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discussions can be held so that an arbiter is aided in making a decision suitable
for the stakeholders. Diﬀerent techniques are used by the facilitators (or directly
by the stakeholders themselves) in their eﬀort of ﬁnding an agreement among the
stakeholders, including mathematical ones, like, e.g., the approach based on non-
dominated actions described in Rios Insua, Holgado and Moreno (2004). In an
e-participation environment, physical meetings are hardly possible since many stake-
holders are involved at the same time and they might be scattered in very distant
places. Therefore, there is the need for a (quite) automatic procedure on which the
stakeholders agree. We will now present an approach, based on Algorithm 1, which
can be seen as a ﬁrst step towards this direction. For simplicity, we suppose that,
for all the involved random quantities Xi, there exists at least one
stakeholder who provides an opinion, i.e. a marginal pdf, on it.
Furthermore, we suppose that at least one stakeholder provides a
marginal pdf diﬀerent from the others, so that no complete agree-
ment among stakeholders is possible.
(H)
Note that, from (H) it follows that if all the stakeholders provide opinions on
all the random quantities, then there is no partial knowledge but the pdf’s are as-
sumed to be incompatible. The procedure is described by the following steps. A
few remarks will follow the description.
1. [Test for disjoint knowledge.] Check, by inspection of the stakeholders’
marginal pdf’s, if they provide opinions on disjoint subsets of random quanti-
ties Xi, forming a partition of them. If this is not the case, then go to Step 2.
Otherwise, the marginal pdf’s can be combined. If we assume them indepen-
dent (i.e. property (3) holds), then there is a unique joint pdf which combines
exactly the stakeholders’ opinions: the product of the marginal pdf’s. The
procedure is then stopped. Otherwise, we consider the Fr` echet class of all
densities with marginal pdf’s given by the stakeholders (see, e.g., Dall’Aglio,
Kotz and Salinetti (1991) for more details on the Fr` echet classes). The class
is not empty since it contains, at least, the independent pdf. In this case, we
move to Step 4.
2. [Test for incompatible knowledge.] Check, by inspection of the stake-
holders’ marginal pdf’s if there is a joint pdf with such marginals. If this is
not the case, go to Step 3. If such joint distribution exists and it is unique
the procedure is stopped; otherwise we move to Step 4.
3. [Merging of partial or incompatible knowledge.] We apply Algorithm
1 to combine partial or incompatible marginals. We obtain a class of joint
pdf’s depending on the assigned weights (Step 3 of Algorithm 1) to each
contribution. Then we move to Step 4.
4. [Test for robustness.] As discussed in the previous steps, we could obtain a
class of joint pdf’s by merging incompatible knowledge, by considering com-
patible marginals not leading to a unique joint pdf and disjoint knowledge
leading to Fr` echet classes. In all cases, a decision among the possible joint
pdf’s is needed: we suggest a quite automatic procedure which relies on the
mathematical structure we gave to the problem. Let us suppose that the stake-
holders can agree on some quantity of interest, summarizing the consequences
of their choices (i.e., pdf’s). If the range of this quantity is small, according
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among the stakeholders since the consequences of any choice of distributions
in the class are quite irrelevant. We say that robustness is achieved and we
stop the procedure. If the range is large, then the stakeholders can be asked
to agree on a criterion to choose a pdf in the class: if this happens we move
to Step 5; otherwise to Step 6.
5. [E-negotiation.] Once a class of pdf’s is entertained, no robustness is
achieved and the stakeholders agree on the necessity of a criterion to choose
a pdf in the class, the role of the facilitator becomes fundamental. He/She
will help the stakeholders in either reducing the width of the class of distribu-
tions, so that Steps 4 and 5 can be iterated, up to the achievement of a robust
(sub)class; or in selecting a criterion to directly choose a pdf in the class.
6. [E-arbitration.] Once all the previous steps have failed and no agreed solu-
tion has been found, then an external authority (arbiter) is asked to make a
decision, e.g. choosing the weights in Algorithm 1.
Summarizing the main features of our approach, which make it suitable for
negotiation and arbitration over Internet in an e-democracy framework, we can say
that
• the original opinions of the stakeholders are kept at any stage of the process;
• the opinions are combined with a very simple, objective rule;
• when considering Algorithm 1, facilitators and arbiters have to work only
on the weights assigned to each opinion and they can be substituted, upon
stakeholders’ agreement, by automatic procedures to select a joint pdf.
Remark 1. Inspection of stakeholders’ marginal pdf’s to verify incompatibility
can hardly show (and only in low dimensional problems) if there is no joint pdf with
such marginals. A method to reduce the dimensionality of the problem is presented
in Wang (2004). In any case, construction of a compatible joint pdf is, in general, a
diﬃcult task. A method, called Iterative Proportional Fitting (IFP), was proposed
by Csisz´ ar (1975). The IFP process is an iterative one which converges asymptoti-
cally to the sought joint pdf, if it exists. Of course, there is no way to tell if the joint
density exists in general. A conjecture about detection of incompatibility via IFP
was illustrated in Jirouˇ sek and Vomlel (1994): cycling of IFP should be a symptom
of incompatibility.
Remark 2. Of course, the facilitator could use his/her usual techniques to get
an agreement among the stakeholders (Steps 4 and 5). The approach presented
here stems from the statistical literature; in particular, is typical of Bayesian ro-
bustness and a plethora of methods are presented in Rios Insua and Ruggeri (2000).
Remark 3. It is worth mentioning that the direct choice of the weights arising
from the application of Algorithm 1 and performed in Step 5, can be made by some
automatic method. For instance, we can choose the values minimizing the sum of
the squared distance between the K stakeholders’ marginals fk and the ones from
the combined pdf e f for all possible values x(Ik) of the random variables X(Ik), i.e.
in the discrete case,
K X
k=1
X
x(Ik)

fk(x(Ik)) − e f(x(Ik))
2
.
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max
k=1,K;x(Ik)


fk(x(Ik)) − e f(x(Ik))


.
In a robust Bayesian framework, another possibility is oﬀered by the Gamma-
minimax approach: we will not illustrate this approach any further but we refer
the interested reader to Ruggeri (2005).
4 Examples
We now illustrate how the proposed method works in some examples and, although
they are mathematical ones by nature, we present them in a context of typical, but
simple, problems in (e-)democracy.
Example 1.
Suppose that a new dam is proposed in an Italian mountain area where farming is
the major activity of the inhabitants. The dam could be used to produce electricity,
also for other parts of the country, and to start some industrial activity in the area.
The eﬀects on farming could be mixed: ﬁelds used for crops and cattle would be
destroyed but a better irrigation system would beneﬁt the remaining ﬁelds. There
are three stakeholders involved in the process: local population (mostly farmers),
the electricity company in charge of building the dam and the power plant and the
geologists in charge of studying the eﬀects of natural hazards on the dam (namely,
earthquakes and landslides). On the top of them there is the regional government
which is willing to ﬁnd an agreement among the stakeholders and, in any case, has
to take a decision about the construction of the dam.
We will concentrate just on one aspect of the problem: the assessment of the
probabilities of the occurrence of some events. Therefore we will not consider util-
ities and we will not involve decision makers maximizing expected utilities. We
identify three possible events: occurrence of a major earthquake (possible in most
Italian areas), falling of a landslide in the artiﬁcial lake created by the dam (as it
happened in Vajont, in North-East Italy in 1963 when 2,000 people died) and the
beneﬁts for the local economy.
The knowledge of the three stakeholders is diﬀerent: the farmers have a strong
opinion on the economical beneﬁts and the past landslides, but they have no instru-
ments to know about possible earthquakes. The electrical company has its opinion
on the economical beneﬁts and we suppose it can use its research center to make
inference on possible earthquakes, based on available catalogues, but it cannot make
any prediction about landslides. Finally, geologists can use their models to predict
both earthquakes and landslides in the area but they have no instruments (and
interest) in assessing about possible economical beneﬁts.
We consider the following three binary variables:
• X1 = {Occurrence of a major landslide in the next 10 years}: no (0) or yes
(1);
• X2 = {Positive beneﬁt on the local economy in the next 10 years}: yes (0) or
no (1).
• X3 = {Occurrence of a major earthquake in the next 10 years}: no (0) or yes
(1);
We denote farmers, electricity company and geologists with labels 1,2 and 3,
respectively; their pdf’s are therefore denoted as f1, f2 and f3. As mentioned before,
6all of them are able to give only (marginal) densities on two random quantities, as
shown in Table 1, coming from Wang (2004) who shows that there exists no joint
pdf of three random variables with the given marginal densities.
Table 1: Values of marginal densities on their support
Marginal (0,0) (0,1) (1,0) (1,1)
f1(x1,x2) 0.47 0.13 0.13 0.27
f2(x2,x3) 0.47 0.13 0.13 0.27
f3(x1,x3) 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.10
Therefore, the farmers think that there is a 47% chance of no landslide and
positive economical beneﬁts; the geologists think of a 10% chance of both earthquake
and landslide occurrences, and so on.
The three variables X1, X2 and X3 have a Bernoulli distribution with probability
0.6 of being equal to 0; it means that farmers and electricity company agree on a
60% chance of positive economical beneﬁts, and so on.
We use the method proposed in the previous sections to combine the evidence
provided by the three incompatible marginals.
We apply now Algorithm 1 described in Section 2 and suppose that three stake-
holders agree on the order of the chain’s rule, so that they consider (Step 1)
f(x1,x2,x3) = f(x3|x2,x1)f(x2|x1)f(x1). (4)
As in Step 2, we split ﬁrst the three given marginals f1, f2 and f3 following the
same order of (4), i.e.
• f1(x1,x2) = f1(x2|x1)f1(x1)
• f2(x2,x3) = f2(x3|x2)f2(x2)
• f3(x1,x3) = f3(x3|x1)f3(x1),
and then we complete the densities using the independence property (3), obtaining
• f1(x1,x2) = f1(x2|x1)f1(x1)
• f2(x2,x3) = f2(x3|x2,x1)f2(x2|x1)
• f3(x1,x3) = f3(x3|x2,x1)f3(x1).
In the example at hand, f1(x1) and f3(x1) contribute to f(x1), whereas f1(x2|x1)
and f2(x2) contribute to f(x2|x1) and f2(x3|x2) and f3(x3|x1) contribute to f(x3|x2,x1).
We combine linearly these probabilities (Step 3), assigning weights α, β and γ, re-
spectively. Summarizing, we get
f(x1) = αf1(x1) + (1 − α)f3(x1)
f(x2|x1) = βf1(x2|x1) + (1 − β)f2(x2)
f(x3|x2,x1) = γf2(x3|x2) + (1 − γ)f3(x3|x1). (5)
It is worth mentioning that we can omit α since f1(x1) ≡ f3(x1). Applying
the chain’s rule to (5), we obtain (Step 4) the joint pdf f (for simplicity, we use f
instead of e f), given by Table 2.
We observe that the f(x1), f(x2) and f(x3) are Bernoulli marginals which assign
probability 0.6 to the outcome 0, whereas the pairwise marginals are given in Table
3.
The stakeholders and the regional government could use these ranges of prob-
abilities to compute expected utilities (provided they agree on the same utility
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(x1,x2,x3) f(x1,x2,x3)
(0,0,0) (30 + 17γ)(36 + 11β)/6000
(0,0,1) (30 − 17γ)(36 + 11β)/6000
(0,1,0) (20 − 7γ)(24 − 11β)/4000
(0,1,1) (20 + 7γ)(24 − 11β)/4000
(1,0,0) (45 + 2γ)(24 − 11β)/6000
(1,0,1) (15 − 2γ)(24 − 11β)/6000
(1,1,0) (30 − 17γ)(16 + 11β)/4000
(1,1,1) (10 + 17γ)(16 + 11β)/4000
Table 3: Values of the bivariate marginals of f on its support
(0,0) (0,1)
f(x1,x2) 0.36 + 0.11β 0.24 − 0.11β
f(x1,x3) 0.3 + (0.06 + 0.05β)γ 0.3 − (0.06 + 0.05β)γ
f(x2,x3) 0.36 − (0.0275 − 0.0275γ)β + 0.11γ 0.24 + (0.0275 − 0.0275γ)β − 0.11γ
(1,0) (1,1)
f(x1,x2) 0.24 − 0.11β 0.16 + 0.11β
f(x1,x3) 0.3 − (0.06 + 0.05β)γ 0.1 + (0.06 + 0.05β)γ
f(x2,x3) 0.24 + (0.0275 − 0.0275γ)β − 0.11γ 0.16 − (0.0275 − 0.0275γ)β + 0.11γ
functions) and study the eﬀect of the choice of β and γ on the maximum expected
utility. We will not pursue this approach any further.
At this point the stakeholders could agree on the weights β and γ or, in absence
of an agreement, the regional government could decide how to attribute the weights.
Note that f(x1,x2) and f1(x1,x2) coincide if and only if β = 1; if γ = 0 then
f(x1,x3) and f3(x1,x2) coincide too and, in this case, f(x1,x2) and f2(x1,x2) do
not coincide, as shown in Table 4.
Table 4: β = 1, γ = 0
(0,0) (0,1) (1,0) (1,1)
f2(x2,x3) .47 .13 .13 .27
f(x2,x3) .3325 .2675 .2675 .1325
Finally, in Table 5 we show the democratic case, i.e. uniform weights.
Table 5 shows that the stakeholders’ marginal pdf’s are very close to the ones
determined by the joint pdf obtained with Algorithm 1. Closer values could be
obtained by considering the automatic procedures described in Remark 3 of Section
3.
Example 2.
A new organization of the work is introduced in a company and its eﬀects on a
period of 10 years are discussed by three stakeholders: the leaders of two diﬀerent
trade unions and the company’s CEO, labeled 1,2 and 3, respectively. The eﬀects
are measured as the increase in number of employees (X1), the decrease in average
salary, adjusted for inﬂation (X2) and the increase in company’s proﬁts (X3). The
stakeholders agree in normalizing the random quantities, subtracting their means
and dividing by their standard deviations, so that Xi ∼ N1(0,1) for i = 1,2,3.
They provide the following bivariate Gaussian pdf’s:
f1(x1,x2) = N2(0,Σ1), f2(x1,x2) = N2(0,Σ2), f3(x2,x3) = N2(0,Σ3)
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(0,0) (0,1) (1,0) (1,1)
f1(x1,x2) .47 .13 .13 .27
f(x1,x2) .415 .185 .185 .215
f2(x2,x3) .47 .13 .13 .27
f(x2,x3) .408125 .191875 .191875 .208125
f3(x1,x3) .30 .30 .30 .10
f(x1,x3) .3425 .2575 .2575 .1425
where
Σ1 =

1 0
0 1

Σ2 =

1 0.5
0.5 1

Σ3 =

1 0.9
0.9 1

are the variance-covariance matrices. The major diﬀerence is about the opinions
of the trade unions leaders about the increase of manpower and the decrease in
average salary: the ﬁrst thinks that there is no correlation among them whereas the
second believes in a quite strong, positive correlation. Following our approach we
have that
f(x1) = αf1(x1) + (1 − α)f2(x1) = N(0,1)
f(x2|x1) = β1 f1(x2|x1) + β2f2(x2|x1) + β3 f3(x2) = β N(1
2x1, 3
4) + (1 − β)N(0,1)
f(x3|x2,x1) = f3(x3|x2) = N( 9
10x2, 19
100)
and, by the chain rule, f turns out to be mixture of two multivariate Gaussian
distribution with null mean and variance-covariance matrix:


1 0.50 0.45
0.50 1 0.90
0.45 0.90 1

 and


1 0 0
0 1 0.9
0 0.9 1


respectively. Note that, although no stakeholder has provided a joint opinion on
X1 and X3, a correlation has been induced by the other opinions as evidenced by
the ﬁrst covariance matrix which assigns a correlation 0.45 between X1 and X3.
5 Discussion
We have formulated a problem in which partial and incompatible opinions from
stakeholders are expressed by pdf’s and we have proposed a procedure, statistically
driven, which could be applied in e-negotiation and e-arbitration. Some examples
have shown its practical application. The proposed method allows in general to
obtain proper pdf’s which are “close” to the stakeholders’ marginals, except for
very pathological cases in which Dirac measures are involved, as in the following
Example 3.
Consider the following pdf’s: f2(x1) ≡ Bernoulli(c); f3(x3) ≡ Bernoulli(z);
f1(x1,x2) as follows:
(0,0) (0,1) (1,0) (1,1)
f1(x1,x2) 0 0 1 − a a
thus f1(x1) ≡ δ1, the Dirac distribution concentrated on 1, and f1(x2) ≡ Bernoulli(a).
According to the approach previously described we should deﬁne
f(x1,x2,x3) = f3(x3)f1(x2|x1)
 
λf1(x1) + (1 − λ)f2(x1)

.
9However f1(x2|x1) is not well deﬁned. The interest of this example mainly lies in
the fact that if c is close to 1 then f1(x1) and f2(x1) are “quite compatible”: never-
theless their composition in the indicated way is impossible, without some suitable
conditions.
The proposed method is heuristically justiﬁed but current research aims to jus-
tify its use as the optimal procedure according to a suitable criterion. The main
eﬀort is about the extension of the result in Krac´ ık (2004) on the optimality with
respect to the Kullback-Leibler divergence.
Acknowledgements
This work was supported by the CNR - AV ˇ CR grant on Advanced techniques of
Bayesian decision making in complex systems and the European Science Founda-
tion programme Towards Electronic Democracy: an Internet based decision support
system. The authors wish to thank Radim Jirouˇ sek and Jiˇ r´ ı Vomlel for introducing
them to the Iterative Proportional Fitting procedure.
References
Csisz´ ar, I. (1975). I-divergence geometry of probability distribution and minimiza-
tion problems, Ann. Prob., 3,146-158.
Dacunha-Castelle, D., and Duﬂo, M. (1986). Probability and Statistics I. Springer,
New York.
Dall’Aglio, G., Kotz, S. and Salinetti, G. Eds. (1991). Advances in Probability
Distributions with Given Marginals, Kluwer, Dordrecht.
Krac´ ık, J. (2004). On composition of probability density function. In Multiple
Participant Decision Making (Andr´ ysek, J., K´ arn´ y, M. and Krac´ ık, J. eds.),
113-121. Advanced Knowledge International, Adelaide, Australia.
Jirouˇ sek, R. and Vomlel, J. (1994). Inconsistent knowledge integration in a prob-
abilistic model. In Proceedings of the Workshop on Mathematical Models for
Handling Partial Knowledge in Artiﬁcial Intelligence, 263-270, Plenum Publ.
Corp., Erice, Italy.
Rios Insua, D., Holgado, J. and Moreno, R. (2004). Multicriteria e-negotiation sys-
tems in e-democracy. Tech. Report, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, Mostoles,
Spain.
Rios Insua, D., and Ruggeri, F. (eds.) (2000). Robust Bayesian Analysis, Springer-
Verlag, New York.
Ruggeri, F. (2005). Gamma-minimax inference. To appear in Encyclopedia of
Statistical Sciences, 2nd ed., (Balakrishnan, N., Read, C.B. and Vidakovic, B.
eds.), Wiley, New York, USA.
Wang, Y.J. (2004). Compatibility among marginal densities, Biometrika, 91, 234-
239.
10